I propose a Bayesian method to analyze bid data from first price auctions under private value paradigms. I use a series representation to specify the valuation density so that bidding monotonicity is always satisfied, and I impose density affiliation by the nonparametric technique of (Beresteanu, 2007) . This flexible method is, therefore, fully compatible with the underlying economic theory. To handle such a rich specification, I use a simulated likelihood, yet obtain a correct posterior by regarding the draws used for simulation as a latent variable to be augmented in the Bayesian framework; see (Flury and Shephard, 2011) . I provide a step-by-step guide of the method, report its performance from various perspectives, and compare the method with the existing one for a range of data generating processes and sample sizes. Finally, I analyze a bid sample for drilling rights in the Outer Continental Shelf that has been widely studied and propose a reserve price that is decision theoretically optimal under parameter uncertainty.
Introduction
Structural data analysis of first price auctions has, in its early stage, specified the density of bidders' latent values (willingness to pay) and constructed the likelihood using the density of observed bids, which is linked to the valuation density via an equilibrium. When a complex statistical model is employed, the likelihood evaluation was computationally impractical and, therefore, the early literature has employed strong parametric assumptions mostly within the independent private value paradigm (IPVP). See, for example, (Donald and Paarsch, 1993; Laffont, Ossard, and Vuong, 1995) .
The seminal article, (Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong, 2000) , has greatly widened the scope of this line of research. By showing that the inverse bidding function is a functional of the density of the optimal bid, the article established the nonparametric identification of the valuation density and proposed a two step estimation method. This method first estimates the bid density functions to form the inverse bidding function and, then, uncovers the distribution of values by evaluating the inverse bidding function at the bid data. Since the method starts from the bid density, which is not the model primitive, the authors named it the indirect approach. This approach enables nonparametric analysis as well as extensions to more general paradigms such as the conditional independent private value paradigm (CIPVP) and the affiliated private value paradigm (APVP); see (Li, Perrigne, and Vuong, 2000, 2002) .
The indirect approach may be, however, incompatible with the paradigm, upon which the empirical method is based. In particular, the estimated inverse bidding function may not be increasing and/or the estimated densities of bids and values may not be affiliated. Even if the estimates are consistent, such problems could in practice lower efficiency and invalidate policy recommendations. This is important to researchers and policymakers because policy prescriptions may have to be drawn even when the sample is small. For example, (Li, Perrigne, and Vuong, 2003) estimated the revenue maximizing reserve price (RMRP) for the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) wildcat auctions under the APVP using a bid sample of 217 auctions, each with two bidders. Although the RMRP in this article is valid only when the bid density is affiliated and the inverse bidding strategy is strictly increasing, the article estimated the bid density without imposing the shape restrictions.
Motivated by this, I propose an empirical framework that is fully consistent with the underlying paradigm. 1 Following the earlier literature, I directly specify the valuation density so that the bidding monotonicity is automatically satisfied. 2 I use a flexible series representation on which the density affiliation can be imposed via the nonparametric shape restriction method of (Beresteanu, 2007) -interdependence among valuations is allowed to be flexible. To handle such a rich specification, the method employs a simulated likelihood, yet obtains the exact posterior by regarding the draws used for simulation as a latent variable to be augmented in the Bayesian framework; see (Andrieu, Doucet, and Holenstein, 2010; Flury and Shephard, 2011) . To make use of this, I finely discretize the sample space to construct a multinomial likelihood, which is then unbiasedly estimated by simulated bid data -the Bayesian method with a simulated likelihood (BSL), therefore, does not suffer simulation error.
An important objective of this paper is also to provide a step-by-step guide of the BSL because this paper introduces these recent techniques to the auction literature. I discuss in detail the theoretical justification and implementation of the method, including the conditions under which the posterior inference is exact and how to carry out the BSL while imposing density affiliation. I also explain the Bayesian model selection to choose the statistical model that fits the data the best, and document the performance from various perspectives such as precision and accuracy of inference, robustness against the prior and discretization, and computing time. In particular, the BSL is more accurate than the previous indirect method for a wide range of data generating processes (DGPs) and sample sizes. The posterior analysis is robust against the prior and discretization for a number of well-behaved distributions.
Finally, the Bayesian method naturally provides a decision theoretic framework, which is shown to be useful for auction design problems in (Aryal and Kim, 2013; Kim, 2013) . I revisit the bid sample from OCS wildcat sales, which was investigated by (Li, Perrigne, and Vuong, 2000, 2003) under the CIPVP and the APVP, respectively. The distribution of the bid data is highly skewed to the left having a long tail to the right with outliers. These outliers imply a positive probability of extremely large values, suggesting an unreasonably large RMRP. First, I use a strong prior to control the tail behavior and implement the BSL to obtain the posterior of the valuation density. I, then, choose a reserve price of $163 that maximizes the posterior predictive revenue. This proposal is optimal under the subjective and simultaneously with the present paper, but adopting a different approach. (Henderson, List, Millimet, Parmeter, and Price, 2012) imposed bidding monotonicity in the IPVP and (Hubbard, Li, and Paarsch, 2012) restricted density affiliation using a parametric copula in the APVP. These articles took the indirect approach.
2 The failure of bidding monotonicity arises only in the indirect approach. (Bierens and Song, 2012 ) also proposed a method of simulated moments using a sieve representation of the valuation density for the IPVP.
expected utility principle of (Savage, 1954; Anscombe and Aumann, 1963) as well as under the average frequentist risk principle. I find that the posterior revenue distribution at the reserve price of $163 dominates, first-order stochastically, the one at the actual reserve price of $15. The revenue gain is economically significant.
In the paper, I assume that the policymaker commits not to sell the auctioned item when no bid exceeds the reserve price following the convention of the empirical auction literature. 3 However, if the policymaker may sell the unsold item in a future auction and bidders expect this, then the auction today competes with the auction tomorrow. Therefore, the RMRP accounting for such dynamic effects should be lower, and it depends on many factors including bidders' discount factor and the number of bidders, e.g., for a fixed number of bidders, the more patient the bidders, the lower the RMRP; see (McAfee and Vincent, 1997) .
In the next section, I provide an overview of the empirical environment and the BSL. In section 3, I illustrate the BSL using the simplest paradigm, the IPVP, and extend in section 4 the BSL to the APVP and analyze the bid sample from the OCS wildcat sales. I then conclude the paper by discussing about auctions with many bidders. An appendix collects computational details.
Methodology Overview
The goal of bid data analysis in this paper is to make inference on the valuation distribution and propose policy recommendations for future auctions. Having this in mind, consider an environment with a bid sample z T := {(b 1,t , . . . , b n,t )} T t=1 with n ≥ 2 is the bid profile at auction t ∈ {1, . . . , T }. All the T sales are in the format of the first-price, sealed-bid auction -each bidder i at auction t bids b i,t after observing her own value v i,t , and obtains the auctioned item by paying b i,t if and only if b i,t = max(b 1,t , . . . , b n,t ). 4 It is important to note that, without any a priori knowledge, the bid sample z T is useless for achieving the goal of data analysis: one can learn the valuation density only when he knows how the observed bids are related to the unobserved values, and one can predict the bidding behavior under different auction rules only under some behavioral assumptions. Thus, a theoretical paradigm is assumed to be known.
Let P be the set of all absolutely continuous distributions on R n + with a differentiable density. Let F AP V ⊂ P collect all exchangeable and affiliated distributions; a distribution F ∈ P is said to be affiliated if and only if its density f satisfies
and f is said to be exchangeable if and only if
for every permutation (i 1 , . . . , i n ), e.g.,
, the first-price, sealed-bid auction induces a game with incomplete information among n bidders for which Milgrom and Weber (1982) derives a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium with a strictly increasing bidding function. Let f y 1 |v 1 (·|·) be the conditional density of y 1 := max{v 2 , . . . , v n } given v 1 . The equilibrium bidding function is then given by
for v ≥ ρ, the reserve price or, otherwise, bidding any b < ρ is optimal. Let β(v; F ) := β(v; F, ρ = 0). The APVP includes the CIPVP and the IPVP as special cases. In particular, let
where F 1 is the marginal distribution of v 1 . If F ∈ F IP V , the bidding strategy (3) simplifies to
I consider the the empirical environment where the correct paradigm is known and
∼ F , and the valuation distribution F satisfies all the theoretical shape restrictions under the given paradigm. Such prior knowledge is critical not only because it links bids to values, but also because it allows a prediction on bidding behavior and seller's revenue under a different ρ.
To analyze the bid data, I use a flexible statistical model {F (·|θ); θ ∈ Θ} to approximate F where Θ is the parameter space. Throughout the paper, the theoretical auction model is referred to as the paradigm, but the flexible density family that is used to approximate the underlying valuation density is referred to as the statistical model or, simply, the model. Let β(·|θ) := β[·|F (·|θ)],b(θ) := lim v→∞ β(v|θ), and 1(A) be the indicator for event A. The likelihood is proportional to
where the joint density of the equilibrium bids is given as
Since there is no closed form expression for the likelihood (5) for a richly parametrized model, the inverse bidding function β −1 (b i,t |θ) must be numerically approximated for every data point b i,t in the sample z T for each evaluation of the likelihood; an optimization routine needs to run n × T times. Notice that for one evaluation of the inverse bidding function, the routine computes the (just) bidding function β(·|θ) repeatedly many times until it finds a point x ∈ R + to solve b i,t = β(x|θ) and, moreover, one evaluation of the bidding function β(·|θ) can already be time consuming, as it involves many integrals in the bidding strategy (3) under the APVP. For this reason, a direct evaluation of the original likelihood (5) has been regarded as something impractical especially for large T . The literature has employed, therefore, either a tightly parametrized statistical model; see (Donald and Paarsch, 1993; Laffont, Ossard, and Vuong, 1995) or the indirect approach; see (Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong, 2000; Li, Perrigne, and Vuong, 2002; Campo, Perrigne, and Vuong, 2003; Li, Perrigne, and Vuong, 2003; Krasnokutskaya, 2011) . Typically, the latter accommodates a nonparametric specification of the density functions. In this paper, I propose a computationally feasible approach that directly specifies the valuation density using a flexible statistical model. Instead of evaluating the true likelihood (5), however, I employ a method of simulated likelihood that evaluates β −1 (·|θ) only small number of times. 5 I shall discuss how to do it shortly in the subsequent sections.
Once the likelihood is approximated by simulation, one could use the maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) taking the classical framework. But, I adopt the Bayesian framework for the following reasons. First, the upper boundb(θ) depends on the parameter θ, in which case the statistical model is irregular and the MLE fails to be efficient, while the Bayes estimator continues to be efficient; see (Hirano and Porter, 2003) . 6 Second, the Bayesian framework naturally provides a decision theoretic framework that is shown to be useful for auction design under parameter uncertainty; see (Aryal and Kim, 2013; Kim, 2013) . Third, if the simulated likelihood is unbiased for the original likelihood, a Bayesian inference can be exact; see (Andrieu, Doucet, and Holenstein, 2010; Flury and Shephard, 2011) .
To elaborate the last point, let y be the sample, p(θ) the prior, p(y|θ) the likelihood, and p(θ|y) the posterior. The objective is to draw an ergodic sample of random parameters
. Letp u (y|θ) be the simulated likelihood such that
where the expectation is over the simulation draws, u, which are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d) uniforms. Sincep u (y|θ) is a joint density of y based on the uniform u, equation (6) implies thatp u (y|θ) gives p(y|θ) after integrated over u. Thus,p u (y|θ) can be interpreted as a joint density of (u, y), i.e.,p u (y|θ) = p(u, y|θ). Thus, if one draws
then {θ s } S s=1 are draws from the correct posterior. Only requirement here is the unbiasedness (6), for which the number of simulation draws can be moderate and does not need to rapidly grow as T increases. Flury and Shephard (2011) discussed this property in detail, and argued that this property is a great advantage over the simulated MLE that requires the simulation size to grow at a rate faster than T 2 .
Independent Private Value Paradigm
In this section, I propose the BSL for the IPVP and shall extend it to the APVP in section 4. Since F ∈ F IP V , the marginal density f 1 is the only model primitive of interest. I 6 For example, consider X1, . . . , Xn iid ∼ Uniform [0, δ0] where δ0 is to be estimated. Then, the maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) is δMLE = max {X1, . . . , Xn} , and its asymptotic distribution is a shifted exponential distribution, where δ0 does not belong to the interior of the support of the sampling distribution of the MLE. Specifically, n(δMLE − δ0) first demonstrate how to construct the likelihood that is to be unbiasedly estimated by simulated data and provide a detailed implementation guide, documenting various aspects of the method. I then run a series of Monte Carlo experiments to compare the BSL with the nonparametric method of (Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong, 2000) .
Valuation Density and Simulated Likelihood
Consider v 1 ∈ [0, 1]. Let H be the Hilbert space of functions from [0, 1] to R and let {φ j } ⊂ H be a sequence of linearly independent functions whose linear span is dense in H, i.e., for any h ∈ H and for any ε > 0, there is an index set I and a sequence of real numbers {θ j } j∈I such that h − j∈I θ j φ j < ε. 7 Polynomials, splines, or Fourier functions can construct such {φ j }. The log density of v 1 can be approximated by
with θ := {θ j } j∈I and the normalizing constant c(θ) for any given accuracy and, therefore, the statistical model (7) is said to be flexible. The statistical literature develops nonparametric methods using this property. The classical statistics theoretically establishes the asymptotic properties of the estimate, and derives the rate at which the number of components, I , increases as the sample size grows to obtain the desirable asymptotic properties. In practice, the number of components is always chosen informally, as (Wasserman, 2006) pointed out, by the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) or Akaike information criterion (AIC) or some other data driven methods like cross-validation. The Bayesian statistics, on the other hand, regards the number of components as one of the parameters and updates its prior over the set of all positive integers via Bayes rule; see (Ferguson, 1973; Escobar and West, 1995; Petrone, 1999) . The Bayesian nonparametric methods are technically complicated, and I do not attempt to develop a fully nonparametric method that adopts a simulated likelihood. In subsection 3.3, instead, I illustrate how to choose the number of components using the Bayesian model selection. Note that the BIC and the AIC are rough approximations of this formal model selection, each assuming a different prior.
7 For example, the index set I can be the set of all nonnegative integers less than some pre-specified number. But, I do not specify I for the time being because the elements of I depend on the choice of φ. The norm is here defined by the usual inner product, i.e., h := ( h 2 dν) 1 2 where ν denotes the Lebesgue measure.
Since F ∈ F IP V and (b 1 , . . . , b n ) are all equilibrium bids, g(b 1 , . . . , b n |F ) = n i=1 g 1 (b i |F ) where g 1 (·|F ) denotes the marginal bid density of b 1 ; see (Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong, 2000) . Therefore, z T is considered as a random sample of size n × T from g 1 (·|F ) with a one dimensional sample space. Let B ⊂ [0, 1] include all bids in z T and
The bin probability under θ is given by
To define the likelihood, let
. . , D. The associated sample histogram is then y := (y 1 , . . . , y D ), which can be viewed as a nonparametric estimate of the bid density up to normalization. 8 Let y := max y. Then, the probability mass of y under θ (the likelihood of θ for given y) is
Suppose now that the statistical model f 1 (·|θ) is given. One can then draw
independently also across j = 1, . . . ,ȳ by a standard scheme such as the inverse CDF, which first draws u 1 (u j r |θ) with F 1 (v|θ) := v 0 f 1 (α|θ)dα for all j and r. 9 Then, the bin probability (8) is unbiasedly estimated bŷ
, for any j = 1, . . . ,ȳ,
Notice that β −1 (·|·) needs to be evaluated only small number of times, D. Observe also that
for each j ∈ {1, . . . ,ȳ} up to a multiplicative constant.
8 (Chamberlain, 1987) obtains the asymptotic efficiency bound of the GMM estimator using the fact that a multinomial distribution can be arbitrarily close to the true distribution; see Lemma 3 in the article.
9 One could alternatively use the accept/reject sampler. For one dimensional problem, however, the inverse CDF is simpler and quicker. I use the accept/reject sampler for the multivariate problem in the next section. See Appendix A for more details.
To see this, suppose that the indicators are all one. Then,
where the equality holds because the event is negligible that a simulated value belongs to more than one bin. Moreover, since the simulated values are all independent, the expectation of (9) with all the indicators being one is written as
When some indicators are zero, the same argument holds as the bin probability with 1(y d > j − 1) = 0 becomes one. Notice that the total number of simulation draws isȳ × R with y much smaller than T . Moreover, β −1 (·|·) needs to be evaluated only at the grid points;
. For the rest of the paper, let
, which is the simulated likelihood, where u denotes the auxiliary uniform variable used for simulation.
Illustration
I explain the implementation of the BSL in the IPVP using an artificial bid sample, for which the valuation distribution is characterized by v =ṽ −0.055 (Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong, 2000) used LogN (0, 1) · 1(ṽ ∈ [0.055, 2.5]) for the Monte Carlo study in the article. I rescale this distribution so that the support is the unit interval. I consider (n, T ) = (2, 200). I generate a sample of T = 200 pairs of bids, z T , for which I find (average, standard deviation, skewness)=(0.158, 0.095, 0.316). In this subsection, I illustrate the BSL only using this artificial bid sample, but the exercise here is only one of many that are soon discussed. For example, for this given data, I run the BSL with ten different statistical models in subsection 3.3. Moreover, I implement the method for a number of different pairs of valuation distributions and sample sizes in subsection 3.4. Each panel shows a basis function of the Legendre polynomials φj for some j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 20}.
The function φj has j − 1 extrema with support [0, 1], i.e., as j increases φj gets noisy.
Specification of f 1 (·|θ) and Prior
To construct the basis functions, I use the Legendre polynomials φ j (v) :
. I use the prior in the form of p(θ) = j∈I p(θ j ) with θ j ∼ N (0, (10 · 2 j ) −1 ) for all j ∈ I := {1, . . . , k}. Since the prior mean of θ j is zero for all j, the prior predicts the uniform density on [0, 1], i.e., the density (7) is a constant function if θ j = 0 for all j. As shown in Figure 1 , φ j has j − 1 extrema. Since the prior variance of θ j decreases in j, θ j would get probabilistically close to zero as j increases. This suggests that a noisy density is unlikely under the prior. I use k = 7. As noted above, I consider alternative models in subsection 3.3, and the statistical model with k = 7 can be chosen by the formal model selection discussed there.
Before computing the posterior, it would be useful to check what the prior and the model say about the data. To do so, I draw θ ∼ p(θ) and generate a bid sample under θ of the same size as z T , and obtain its sample mean, standard deviation, and skewness. After repeating this many times, Figure 2 the prior, marking the summary statistics of the original data z T by the plain lines. The data z T can be considered as a realization under the prior. This exercise is called a prior predictive analysis; see (Geweke, 2005) . I discretize the sample space by equidistant grid points (
with D = 20; I findȳ = 34. So, β −1 only needs to be evaluated D = 20 times. As will be shown in subsection 3.2.4, the posterior inference is almost identical under much more coarse discretizations and, therefore, the loss of information due to the discretization with D = 20 seems to be small.
Posterior Computation
In order to explore the posterior distribution, I employ a Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm. In particular, I consider the Metropolis-Hastings (MH) algorithm where each component in θ is updated one by one in a prespecified order. To simplify notation, let θ −j be the (sub)vector of all θ a with a < j in θ, and let θ +j collect all θ a with a > j, i.e., θ = (θ −j , θ j , θ +j ). At each MCMC iteration s, let u be a new uniform draw. At each index j, going from 1 to k, the algorithm draws a candidateθ j ∼ q(θ j |θ s−1 j ), the proposal density. LetL :=p u (y|θ
where
, L * ), otherwise. After updating θ k , the algorithm moves onto the (s + 1) th iteration. Under mild conditions, (Tierney, 1994) shows that for any measurable function h,
−→ Θ h(θ)p(θ|y)dθ as S grows regardless of the starting point θ 0 ∈ Θ. A sufficient condition for this is that the posterior is absolutely continuous with respect to the proposal density; see theorem 4.5.5 in (Geweke, 2005) . Thus, if q(·|·) has the full support in R, the algorithm converges. In this paper, I draw a candidateθ j from N (θ
, σ 2 j ) with a prespecified σ 2 j for all j = 1, . . . , k. Then, the algorithm converges and q(θ (11) due to the symmetry of the Gaussian density. This method is known as the Gaussian MH algorithm.
In practice, the performance of the Gaussian MH algorithm depends on the choice of the scale parameters {σ 2 j } j∈I . If σ 2 j is too small,θ j will be very close to θ s−1 j and the algorithm would not effectively explore Θ. If σ 2 j is too large, the proposal density very often generatesθ j that is unlikely under the posterior and thereby mostly rejected -the algorithm will seldom move to another point. Typically, when the model is simple, the algorithm works fine for a wide range of the scale parameters. But, tuning up {σ 2 j } j∈I can be hard when θ is high dimensional, and it depends on a number of factors including the sample, the prior, and the statistical model. In this paper, I use some preliminary MCMC outcomes to determine {σ 2 j } j∈I . Here is an example. For the artificial sample z T generated above, I consider ten statistical models, as shown in Table 1 , each with a different k. For the simplest model (k = 3), the algorithm works well for a wide range of scale parameters. For the models with larger k, I set {σ 2 j } k−1 j=1 at the posterior standard deviations obtained from the model with k − 1 components, and set σ 2 k at a small number such as (0.02 2 ). 10 I check the convergence of the MCMC outcomes by the separated partial means test of (Geweke, 2005) . The idea of the test is as follows. Suppose I have {θ s j } S s=1 for each component 10 For the samples of T = 500 or 1000 in subsection 3.4, I set σ 2 j to be proportional to the posterior standard deviation of θj obtained from the MCMC outcomes for smaller samples of T = 200 or 500. All the programming codes used in this paper pass the software validation test of (Cook, Gelman, and Rubin, 2006) . j drawn from a fixed distribution. Then, the null hypothesis that the mean of {θ s j } S/2 s=S/4+1 equals the mean of {θ s j } S s=S×3/4+1 must be true. 11 I test the null for each component θ j , j ∈ I. Then, I have I p-values. I terminate the MH algorithm if the smallest p-value exceeds 0.01. If not, the MH algorithm collects one hundred additional draws, and runs the test again until the test fails to reject. Thus, the final S is random. I run the test at s = 20, 000 for the first time. Once the chain terminates, I use the last seventy five percent of the iterations, i.e., {θ} S s=S/4+1 , for inference and decision making because the convergence test suggests that they are drawn from the posterior. This decision rule is conservative because the component of the worst case has to pass the test. In the exercises of this section, the algorithm mostly passes the convergence test at s = 20, 000 and, thereby, S = 20, 000. For example, for the model with k = 7, the smallest p-value among the nine p-values is 0.493 at s = 20, 000 while the average of the p-values is 0.765.
For given S, the computing time increases linearly in k. 12 For example, for the model with k = 5 for the given sample of T = 200 auctions, the computing time is 3,352 seconds (≈ 56 minutes). When k = 7 and k = 10, it increases to 4,522 seconds and 6,510 seconds, respectively. Similarly, the computing time increases linearly in T as well. In subsection 3.4, I consider larger samples. For k = 7, the computing time for T = 500 (T = 1, 000) is roughly 120% (340%) longer than the case of T = 200.
Inference and Decision Making
First of all, in order to see what the posterior says about the data, I generate a bid sample of the same size as the data z T under each θ s and compute its summary statistics. Panels Figure 2 show the distributions of the summary statistics under the posterior. The posterior predicts the original summary statistics more precisely and accurately than the prior. This exercise is called a posterior predictive analysis; see (Geweke, 2005) . Second, the posterior predictive valuation density is f (v|θ)p(θ|y)dθ, which is the most widely used Bayesian density estimate. Panel (b) in Figure 3 shows the predictive valuation density and the pointwise 2.5 and 97.5 percentiles of the posterior distribution of the valuation density (dashed lines) along with the true valuation density (plain line). This ninety five 11 In other words, the sample is divided into four equally sized blocks and test if the second and the forth have the same mean. Section 4.7 in (Geweke, 2005 ) discusses how to conduct the test accounting for the autocorrelation.
12 I use an iMac 27, which has 2.9 GHz Intel Core i5 and 8 GB 1,600 MHz DDR3 with OS X 10.9.2 (13C64). percent posterior credible band is narrow, i.e., the inference is precise, yet contains the true density over the entire support [0, 1], i.e., the estimate is accurate. The L 2 -difference of the posterior predictive density from the true density is 0.096; see Table 1 under column (B).
Third, the posterior predictive revenue of the seller at reserve price ρ is
where Π(θ, ρ) is the revenue function under θ at ρ. 13 Under the preference orderings of (Savage, 1954; Anscombe and Aumann, 1963) , it is optimal for the seller to maximize the posterior predictive revenue in (12), and the solution to this problem is called the Bayes action. Moreover, the decision rule that chooses the Bayes action is called the Bayes rule, 13 The revenue function under the IPVP is given as Π(θ, ρ) :
n−2 f (y|θ)dy; see (Riley and Samuelson, 1981) . which is shown to be optimal under the average risk frequentist decision principle; see (Berger, 1985; Kim, 2013) . Panel (e) in Figure 3 shows the predictive revenue function and the pointwise 2.5 and 97. Table 1 under columns (D)-(G). The true revenue is maximized at ρ 0 = 0.340 with the revenue 0.2672.
Robustness: Prior and Discretization
The posterior analysis here is robust with respect to the prior and the discretization. Recall that the prior is in the form of p(θ) = k j=1 p(θ j ), each θ j ∼ N (0, c 2 · (10 · 2 j ) −1 ) with c = 1. I additionally consider c ∈ {0.5, 2, 5} -priors 1, 2, and 3, respectively. The upper [lower] panels in Figure 4 reprint the dashed lines in Figure 3 
Bayesian Model Selection
I employ the Bayesian model comparison to choose the statistical model that fits the data the best. The model is indexed by the number of components k for a given specification of {φ j }. Let θ k denote the parameter of the model k. The marginal likelihood of model k with the sample y is then given as p(y|k) = p(θ k )p(y|θ k )dθ k which can be estimated using the MCMC outcomes {θ s k } by the Bridge sampler of (Fruhwirth-Schnatter, 2004; Meng and Wong, 1996) . Let p(k) be the prior probability mass function over the model space. The posterior probability of model k is then given by p(k|y) ∝ p(k)p(y|k). The Bayesian model selection chooses k to maximize the posterior probability. This formal model selection is often approximated by the BIC and AIC, each assuming a different prior over the model space.
Column (A) in Table 1 documents the log marginal likelihoods for the statistical models under consideration. The marginal likelihoods do not vary much across k. (Kass and Raftery, 1995) proposed a widely used rule of thumb -model k is strongly preferred to modelk if log p(y|k) − log p(y|k) > 1/3. This condition is not met for all the models with k ≥ 5 when compared against the model with k = 7. 14 Moreover, the posterior analysis is robust across the statistical models. The posterior predictive densities and the posterior predictive revenue functions are all similar; see Figure 3 , and the Bayes actions for choosing a reserve price ρ and the policy implications are robust; see Table 1 , columns (D)-(G).
Comparison with Previous Methods
In this section, I compare the BSL and the two-step kernel method of (Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong, 2000) . I fix n = 2 but vary T ∈ {200, 500, 1000} with three different valuation distributions: lognormal, exponential, and asymmetric uniform. Thus, there are nine Monte Carlo experiments, each with a different pair of sample size and distribution. In each experiment, I employ one thousand replications. In each replication, I draw a new sample of (n, T ) from the fixed DGP, and run the empirical methods. (Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong, 2000) showed that the valuation density is nonparametrically identified via the inverse bidding function ξ(b)
which is a functional of the bid density g and the bid distribution function G. The method first nonparametrically estimatesĝ andĜ to constructξ, and uncovers the valuation density f 1 using 'pseudo' values {v i,t :=ξ(b i,t )} for b i,t in the sample. Like all other nonparametric methods, this method is sensitive to the choice of smoothing parameters, i.e., bandwidths for kernels. I consider two bandwidth configurations: one is the bandwidth selection in (Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong, 2000) and the other is the bandwidths that minimize the L 2 -difference of the estimate from the true density. 15 The former, which I call 'GPV,' is the most natural (or initial) choice for practitioners, whereas the latter, 'Oracle GPV,' gives the most accurate estimate, but it is infeasible in practice because the true density is unknown. For the BSL, I consider the statistical models with k ∈ {5, 7, 10} instead of implementing the formal model selection because the posterior analysis is robust to a wide range of statistical models as shown in subsection 3.3 and below as well. The experiments below show that the BSL is much more accurate than the GPV, and even better than the Oracle GPV.
Lognormal
The lognormal density used here is defined in subsection 3.2. Figure 3(a) shows the posterior predictive density estimate (middle dashed line) in the first replication of the Monte Carlo experiment with T = 200. This is a typical density estimate under the BSL with k = 5. Since I employ one thousand replications, each generating a different estimate, I have one thousand density estimates, which form the sampling distribution of the density estimator. Figure 5 (a) summarizes the sampling distribution by its pointwise mean and 2.5 and 97.5 percentiles (dashed) along with the true valuation density (solid). For the models with k ∈ {7, 10}, Figures 3(b) -(c) and 5(b)-(c) are read in the same way. For all k ∈ {5, 7, 10}, the BSL closely approximates the valuation density with narrow ninety five percent frequency bands. Here, a distinction needs to be made; the frequency band represents the variation of the posterior predictive density, f (·|θ)p(θ|z T )dθ, over the distribution of the sample z T , while the posterior credible band measures the variation of f (·|θ) with respect to the posterior p(θ|z T ) for a given sample z T . Figure 5 (d) illustrates a typical GPV estimate, the one obtained from the first replication, (dashed), and panel (e) summarizes the sampling distribution of GPV by its ninety five percent frequency band. The typical GPV estimate does not well approximate the valuation 15 (Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong, 2000) used the triweight kernel (35/32)(1 − u 2 ) 3 1(|u| ≤ 1) for both bid density and valuation density. The article proposed a combination of bandwidths hg = 1.06ω b (nT ) −1/5 for the bid density estimate and h f = 1.06ωv(nT ) −1/5 for the valuation density estimate whereω b andωv are the sample standard deviations of the observed T bids and the estimatedT values after trimming out boundaries. density and the frequency band is far wider than any of the BSL models. As Table 2 (first block for T = 200) documents, the MISE of the GPV estimate is about five times larger than the MISEs for the BSL models; see columns (A) and (B). 16 Although the Oracle GPV approximates more accurately than the GPV, its MISE is still larger than those of the BSLs. Table 2 also summarizes policy implications on choosing a reserve price for the revenue maximizing seller across the methods. For the BSL, I maximize the seller's posterior predictive revenues (12), and for the GPV, I use the nonparametric RMRP estimate of (Li, Perrigne, and Vuong, 2003) , which constructs the revenue as a functional of the bid distribution functions,Ĝ andĝ, to choose a point in the bid space, say x, that maximizes this revenue function, and proposesρ x :=ξ(x) = x +Ĝ(x)[(n − 1)ĝ(x)] −1 as the RMRP.
16 Letfz be an estimate for the true density f0.
The MISE is small, only when both variance and bias are small. In each replication, I choose a reserve price and find the associated true revenue under each procedure. Since I employ one thousand replications considering four procedures, I have four sets of one thousand true revenues. Columns (C) and (D) in the first block of Table 2 present their averages for T = 200. 17 The average revenues of the BSL models are 5.6 percent larger than the GPV, (column (E)) and the BSL produces higher revenues than the GPV 863∼889 times out of one thousand replications (column (F)).
The use of the GPV can be justified by its large sample properties, e.g., as the sample size grows, the estimates converge to the true quantities. I repeat the Monte Carlo study with larger sample sizes, T ∈ {500, 1000}. The BSL continues to produce smaller MISEs and larger revenues than the GPV; see Table 2 , columns (A) and (B). As T grows, the ninety percent frequency bands get narrower for all the methods under consideration, but typical GPV estimates continue to be noisy and the frequency bands of the GPV are much wider than the frequency bands of the BSL models. I do not present graphical comparisons as they are qualitatively the same as the case of T = 200, i.e., Figure 5 . 
Exponential
All the settings for the Monte Carlo experiments are the same, but values are drawn from the exponential distribution with mean 1/6 that is truncated at one, i.e., f (v) ∝ exp(−6 · v) · 1(v ∈ [0, 1]). The upper block of Figure 6 summarize the sampling distributions of the BSLs for T = 200, panel (d) plots a typical GPV estimate, and panels (e) and (f) summarize the sampling distributions of the GPV and the Oracle GPV estimators. The BSL estimates are much closer to the true density than the GPV estimate and even closer than the Oracle GPV estimate, which is confirmed by the MISE comparisons in Table 3 . From such results, it is natural to expect that choosing a reserve price using the BSL should be more profitable, which is again confirmed in Table 3 . I repeat the exercise for larger sample sizes T ∈ {500, 1000}. The BSLs unanimously produce smaller MISEs and larger revenues than the previous methods; see Table 3 . I do not graphically present the results for T ∈ {500, 1000} as the results are qualitatively the same as Figure 6 , but with narrower frequency bands. 
Non-exchangeable
In practice, the prior knowledge on the shape of the valuation distribution and bidders' bidding behavior can be incorrect. In order to see how the BSL and GPV perform when the paradigm is misspecified, I run an additional set of Monte Carlo experiments where the valuation density violates exchangeability (2) and, thereby, leading to an asymmetric bidding game. In particular, I consider the vector of (v 1 , v 2 ) that is distributed as
. For the induced game, a Bayesian Nash equilibrium is characterized by the bidding strategies (Krishna, 2002) . I use (v 1 ,v 2 ) = (1, 4/5). In each Monte Carlo replication, I draw {(v 1,t , v 2,t )} T t=1 from the true valuation density and compute b i,t = β i (v i,t ) for every i = 1, 2 and t = 1, . . . , T . Then, I implement the empirical methods for the bid sample, {(b 1,t , b 2,t )} T t=1 , under the false assumption that the true density is exchangeable and the bidding game is symmetric. Figure 7 summarizes the results of the Monte Carlo experiment for T = 200. The solid lines on each panel represent the marginal densities of the true valuation distribution. The BSL estimates pass between the two marginals with narrow ninety five percent frequency bands, but the GPV estimate is very different from the true density with a greater sampling variation. I find that the MISEs of the BSL for k ∈ {5, 7, 10} are less than fifty percent of the MISEs of the GPV and are slightly smaller than the MISEs (Li, Perrigne, and Vuong, 2000, 2003) . Especially, I explain how to flexibly impose the density affiliation (1). 
Data
The U.S. department of interior has organized auctions to sell off drilling rights on offshore oil and gas development in areas of the Gulf of Mexico. (Li, Perrigne, and Vuong, 2003 ) studies a dataset of T = 217 auctions, each with n = 2 bidders between 1954 and 1969. Let z T := {(b 1,t , b 2,t )} T t=1 , the sample of the T = 217 bid pairs. The average bid and standard deviation are, respectively, $145.78 and $255.72 per acre in 1972 dollars and the sample extremums are $19.70 and $2,220.28. (Li, Perrigne, and Vuong, 2003) nonparametrically estimates the RMRP under the APVP. In particular, it is assumed that Figure 8 
Specification of Valuation Density with Shape Restrictions
When F ∈ F AP V , the entire joint density has to be specified unlike the IPV case because the independence is not guaranteed. In a bivariate case, the statistical model (7) extends to
where I is the index set that determines the number of components and Θ is the matrix of all coefficients {θ i,j } (i,j)∈I 2 . In order to exploit the prior knowledge that F ∈ F AP V , I employ a statistical model on which it is convenient to impose the theoretical shape restrictions, especially, density affiliation (1). The statistical model (13) satisfies (1) if and only if
for every (v 1 , v 2 ) ∈ R 2 . This gives infinitely many inequality conditions. In order to impose this restriction allowing for a flexible interdependence structure, I employ the nonparametric method of imposing shape restrictions of (Beresteanu, 2007) , which uses B-splines. Thus, I construct the basis functions using B-splines. Let φ j (x) :=φ the same number of positive kernels, which is necessary for shape restriction. The statistical model (13) is then affiliated if the inequality condition in (14) holds at every point in the finite set
That is, the infinitely many constraints in (14) are represented only by (k + 1) 2 inequalities. To simplify the notation, define the matrix of the basis functions evaluated at the points in
This (k + 3) × (k + 1) matrix contains the (k + 3) basis functions, each evaluated at every point in
The inequality conditions in (14) with the B splines is then written as Φ ΘΦ ≥ 0 (k+1)×(k+1) with the element-by-element inequality ≥. Finally, the statistical model (13) is exchangeable if and only if Θ is symmetric, i.e., θ i,j = θ j,i . 21 Thus, the number of effective components in Θ is (k + 3)(k + 4)/2. Moreover, since only the sample space below 45 • line needs to be considered under exchangeability, the number of constraints reduces to (k + 1)(k + 2)/2.
In order to use the statistical model (13) with the support [0, 1] 2 , one may in principle rescale the bid data so that the rescaled pair of values belongs to [0, 1] 2 . Two problems arise. First, the bid distribution with such a heavy tail in Figure 8 suggests that the upper boundary of the valuation may be extremely large, but it is unknown. Second, even if the boundary is known, since it is very large, the true density of the rescaled value would be highly condensed on a small neighborhood of the origin (0, 0) in the support [0, 1] 2 . However, in order to approximate such a high peak, the model (13) must have many components, i.e., large k, but most coefficients are close to zero. To see this, look at Figure 9 ; as k increases, the support of φ 0 at zero gets narrower. So, in order to express a peak highly condensed around zero, k has to be large and only φ 0 has a large coefficient, but the other coefficients are all close to zero. Then, the marginal likelihood of such a model would be small because the prior over a higher dimensional space is more diffused, penalizing over-parametrization.
For this reason, I transform the value in such a way that the distribution of the transformed value spreads out more evenly over the unit square than the case of rescaling. Let F (·|µ) be a strictly monotone transformation, parametrized by µ, that maps from R + to [0, 1]. I can now employ the model (13) with much smaller k to approximate the joint density of the transformed value (x 1 , x 2 ) := [F (v 1 |µ),F (v 2 |µ)]. The statistical model for the original value (v 1 , v 2 ) is then written as
wheref (·|µ) denotes a derivative ofF (·|µ). SinceF (·|µ) is a monotone mapping onto [0, 1], it is essentially a distribution function. For example, the exponential distribution or the lognormal distribution could be used. I interpret (15) thatf (·|µ) first approximates the marginal valuation density, and the additional terms improve the approximation accounting for a flexible interdependence structure. For a given accuracy, therefore, iff (·|µ) is close to the true density, a moderate number of components would suffice. Since the role ofF is simply to spread out the probability mass more evenly over the support of the statistical model (13), I choose a simple parametric distribution that is skewed to the left. In particular, since the histogram of the bid data (Figure 8(a) ) is similar to the exponential density (solid line), believing that the value might be similarly distributed, I
use the exponential distribution with densityf (v|µ) = 1(v ≥ 0) exp(−v/µ)/µ. 22 Such beliefs do not have to be exact because the additional terms explain the gap between the leading terms and the true density function. One could, in principle, chooseF formally via the Bayesian model selection discussed in subsection 3.3 with a larger set of statistical models, each indexed by a pair of (F , k) . But, the computing costs would then increase substantially, without much improving the data analysis.
Prior Specification and Implications
The statistical model for the valuation density is parametrized by (µ, Θ) for a given k. Recall that θ i,j is the coefficient attached to the kernel centered at the grid point (i/k, j/k) with (i, j) ∈ I 2 . Therefore, if θ i,j is constant for all (i, j) ∈ I 2 , the density (13) of the transformed value (x 1 , x 2 ) = F (v 1 |µ),F (v 2 |µ) is the uniform over [0, 1] 2 . If θ i,j for a certain (i, j) is larger than other elements in Θ, the density would have a mode at (i/k, j/k); the larger the θ i,j , the bigger the mode. Now, consider the prior given as µ/1000 ∼ N (1, 1) · 1(µ > 0) and
with η ∈ (0, 10). The indicators in (16) are associated with the theoretical shape restrictions; affiliation (1) and exchangeability (2). Hence, whenever the proposal function draws a parameter that violates (1), the candidate is automatically rejected because the prior at the candidate is zero; see the acceptance probability (11). All {θ i,j } are distributed around zero. The standard deviation in (17) starts with ten at (i, j) = (0, 0), decreases quickly, and becomes η at i = k, the right boundary of the unit square. Therefore, the density of the transformed value (x 1 , x 2 ) has a greater variation around the origin than the tail area: the smaller is the η, the more strongly the prior controls the tail behavior. I use first η = 0.1 and check alternative values later. To see the implication of the prior on the data distribution, I draw (µ, Θ) from the prior, 22 Such beliefs can be verified by a simple simulation exercise. I draw a bid sample of size one thousand from the exponential distribution with mean 1, and compute associated values by evaluating the inverse bidding function. The simulated value has a distribution similar to the exponential distribution with mean 2.4, but with a heavier tail. Roughly, its density is decreasing and convex toward the origin, and its three quartiles are (0.618, 1.694, 4.403) , whereas the three quartiles of the exponential with mean 2.4 are (0.690, 1.664, 3.327). generate a bid sample of T = 217 auctions, each with two bidders, under (µ, Θ), and obtain summary statistics -the average, the standard deviation, and the skewness of the winning bids. After repeating many times, panels (a)-(c) in Figure 10 scatter the predictive distributions of the summary statistics (÷100). The plain lines indicate the summary statistics of the original data z T from the OCS wildcat sales.
Posterior Computation, Inference, and Decision Making
from the posterior using the MH algorithm; see subsection 3.2.2. The parameters here include a matrix, whereas the parameters in the previous section are one dimensional. Although slightly modified, the MH algorithm is essentially the same: it updates, as before, one component at a time with a deterministic order at each MH iteration s estimating unbiasedly the likelihood by simulation. 23 The simulated values in (10) drawn from f (v 1 , v 2 |µ, Θ) are now n = 2 dimensional; see Appendix A for the accept/reject sampling scheme. Employing the statistical model with k = 4, I iterate the MCMC algorithm S = 20, 000 times recording every 10 th outcome and check the convergence by the separated partial means test. 24 The smallest p-value among the twenty nine p-values is 0.012 and the average of the p-values is 0.426.
In order to see the implications of the posterior on the summary statistics, I perform the posterior predictive analysis. I generate a bid sample of size T = 217 and compute its summary statistics: the average, the standard deviation, and the skewness of winning bids. After repeating this exercise many times, panels (d)-(f) in Figure 10 show the predictive distributions of the summary statistics under the posterior along with the summary statistics of the data z T . The distributions are more condensed than the prior and the summary statistics of the original data z T may be considered as a realization under the posterior.
Panel (a) in Figure 11 plots the data histogram along with the posterior predictive marginal bid density (solid), and a ninety five percent posterior credible band (dashed), and panel (b) plots similarly for the marginal valuation density. 25 The predictive bid density explains well the sample overall, but the prior controls the tail behavior. The valuation density is more diffuse toward the right than the bid densities because values are larger than bids. Panel (c) shows the valuation density that is predicted only by the leading termf (·|µ), which suggests that a large portion of the valuation density is still explained by the additional terms in the statistical model (15).
The seller may wish to choose a reserve price to extract the largest revenue from the future auction. For simplicity, the seller's value for the auctioned tract is assumed to be zero. Let A ⊂ R + be the set of all feasible reserve prices. The seller's revenue under (µ, Θ) with ρ ∈ A is given by Π(µ, Θ, Figure 11 demonstrates the posterior predictive revenue (plain) along with the ninety five percent posterior credible band (dashed) The Bayes action (12) for this problem is the reserve price of 163 dollars per acre conditional on the prior and the likelihood. The posterior predictive revenue at 163 dollars is 283.96 dollars per acre with the ninety five 24 One could choose k formally by the Bayesian model section. In the previous version of this paper, I found that the log marginal likelihood is maximized at k = 4 and drops sharply as k increases because the number of components increases at a rate of O(k 2 ) and thereby the statistical model getting quickly overparametrized. Moreover, when k increases, the MH algorithm must iterate more to explore dramatically expanding parameter space and, therefore, the computing time increases.
25 The posterior distribution of the bid density is obtained via a usual kernel smoothing method over simulated data under each parameter value (µ, Θ) drawn from the MCMC algorithm. [$241.71, $332.61] . On the other hand, the posterior expected revenue at the actual price of 15 dollars is 240.56 dollars per acre with the ninety five percent posterior credible interval of [$202.42, $285.88] , which includes the average revenue (winning bid) in the sample of 224.32 dollars. The predictive revenue distribution at the optimal choice dominates, first order stochastically, the predictive revenue distribution at the actual reserve price as shown on panel (e). Thus, the revenue gain is economically significant.
I have so far employed the discretization with D = 10. For each D ∈ {7, 9, 11}, I repeat the posterior inference and decision making. The posterior predictive bid density and valuation density are very similar to the base specification with D = 10, i.e., Figure 11 . The Bayes actions for choosing a reserve price are also similar; they are 158, 162, and 161 dollars per acre for D = 7, 9 and 11, respectively. 
Prior Sensitivity and Robust Decision Making
I check the prior sensitivity on posterior inference and decision making. Unlike the Monte Carlo experiments in section 3, the dataset from the OCS wildcat sales has a long tail with some outliers, which may suggest the existence of very high values. I first consider four priors, say, priors 1-4, that all control the tail behavior but with different degrees; they use η ∈ {0.01, 0.2, 0.3, 0.5}, respectively, in equation (17). Only prior 1 with η = 0.01 controls the tail behavior more strongly than the original prior with η = 0.1. Panels (a)-(c) in Figure 12 illustrates the posterior predictive densities of the bid and the value (plain lines on panels (a) and (b)) along with the ninety five percent posterior credible bands under the original prior (dashed). All the posterior predictive densities are included in the associated credible bands and they are very similar to the predictive densities under the original prior. The posterior predictive densities and revenues are robust as long as the prior is not substantially different.
Similarly, panel (c) plots the posterior predictive revenues under the priors 1-4 along with the ninety five percent posterior credible band under the original prior. For the priors under consideration, the posterior analysis is robust.
In addition, I consider substantially different priors with η ∈ {1, 2}, under which the posteriors predict fairly different densities of bids and valuations (panels (d) and (e)), and completely different revenues (panel (f)); the Bayes actions are 664 and 714 for each η ∈ {1, 2}, respectively. In this case, it would be useful to employ a decision method that is robust against the prior. Let Γ be the set of all reasonable priors. Under the preference orderings of (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989) , it is optimal to maximize
which represents the lower envelop of these posterior predictive revenues. 26 The Γ-maxmin rule chooses a reserve price to maximize this lower envelop, securing the decision-maker against the most pessimistic revenue. As an illustration, suppose that Γ includes all the priors considered so far. Then, the Γ-maxmin rule chooses 229 dollars; see Figure 12 (f).
5 Concluding Remark: large n I conclude the paper by discussing the empirical environment with a large number of bidders, n ≥ 2. Since this problem does not affect the BSL for the IPVP, I focus on the APVP where the BSL would suffer the curse of dimensionality, just like all other flexible statistical methods. For n ≥ 2, the statistical model (13) extends to
For a small n such as 2 or 3, the BSL that I have illustrated so far would be practical. As n grows, however, the number of components increases at a rate of O(k n ) -not only does the statistical model get quickly overparametrized, but also the computation becomes impractical. To gain tractability, therefore, it is inevitable to either employ a simple parametric model or make a stronger assumption on the auction paradigm. I consider the CIPVP as a reasonable alternative to the APVP because the CIPVP allows for a flexible specification, while values are still affiliated in a restrictive, but intuitive, way: the affiliation arises through an unknown common component, denoted by κ. Note that (Li, Perrigne, and Vuong, 2000) analyzed the OCS wildcat data under the CIPVP. The joint density of (v 1 , . . . , v n , η) has the form of f κ (κ) n i=1 f 1 (v i |κ). and f (v 1 , . . . , v n ) is obtained by integrating κ out. Following (Li, Perrigne, and Vuong, 2000) , if I assume f 1 (v i |κ) = f α (α i ) with α i = v i /κ, then I only need to specify two one dimensional densities f κ (·) and f α (·) using a flexible statistical model. Let f κ (·|θ κ ) and f α (·|θ α ) be such specifications where θ κ and θ α be the parameter vectors. Then, the posterior of (θ κ , θ α , κ) can be obtained. 27 Even if the number of components does not explode, however, there would still be the curse of dimensionality regarding the sample space and its discretization because the number of bins also increases at a rate of O(D n ), and the simulation size must increase accordingly. 28 In order to get around this problem, I propose to use a summary statistic H : R n + → R m + with small m such as 2 or 3, and discretize the space of {(h 1,t , . . n,r )} (r,j)∈{1,...,R}×{1,...,ȳ} . This approach is closely related to the rapidly growing area of Approximate Bayesian Computation (ABC) where high dimensional data are replaced by a low dimensional statistic; see (Marin, Pudlo, Robert, and Ryder, 2012 ). The optimal choice of H is one of the main topics of on-going research in the area of ABC. In general, one should consider several reasonable summary statistics and check the robustness of the analysis. For auction data analysis, there are useful theoretical results that shed a light on the problem of choosing H. For example, (Esponda, 2008) argues that when each bidder knows the joint density of her own bid and two top bids, she has a correct belief on the joint density of all bids in a symmetric private value paradigm. This suggests that the summary statistic collecting (any) one bid and two top bids would be very informative on the entire joint bid density, which identifies the joint valuation distribution; see (Li, Perrigne, 27 In Bayesian analysis, both parameters and latent variables are unobserved quantities that are distributed as some prior, which is updated via the Bayes theorem whenever data are observed. There is no distinction between the parameters (θη, θα) and the latent variable η in the Bayesian framework.
28 When there are too many bins, some bins would have no simulated bids unless the simulation size is large. Then, the estimated likelihood would often be zero and the MH algorithm does not effectively explore the posterior.
and Vuong, , 2002 . In addition, when the bidders' identities are not observed, but the objective of analysis is to choose a reserve price, it would be sufficient to use only top two bids; see (Athey and Haile, 2002) .
A Simulation of Values and Evaluation of Bidding Functions
I explain how to draw values from the statistical model and evaluate the bidding functions. Let (x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x 100 ) be the equidistant knot points on [0, 1] with (x 0 , x 100 ) = (0, 1).
A.1 Independent Private Value Paradigm
First, I approximate the associated CDF via the trapezoid rule by evaluating the statistical model in (7) at each point in (x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x 100 ). Letĩ be the i-th element in I. For the Legendre polynomial basis functions, I = (1, . . . , k) andĩ = i. But, for the B-splines basis functions, I = (0, 1, . . . , k) andĩ = i − 1. Let Φ x be the matrix whose (i, j) element is φĩ(x j ) and θ be the column vector whose i th element is θĩ. Let also a 1 j be the j th element in exp[Φ x θ], i.e., a 1 j = exp j∈I θ j φ j (x j ) , for j = 0, 1, . . . , 100. Then, let a 2 0 := 0 a 2 j := a 2 j−1 + (x j − x j−1 )(a 1 j + a 1 j−1 )/2 for j > 0, i.e., a 2 j ≈ x j 0 exp j∈I θ j φ j (t) dt. Then, let p j := a 2 j /a 2 100 , i.e., p j ≈ F 1 (x j |θ) for j = 0, 1, . . . , 1. Note that 0 = p 0 < p 1 < · · · < p 100 = 1. In order to drawṽ ∼ F 1 (·|θ), I drawũ ∼ Uniform[0, 1] and letj be the index such that u ∈ (pj, pj +1 ). Finally, let
i.e.,ṽ ≈ F −1 1 (ũ|θ). Second, observe that for n = 2,
Redefinej as the index such that b * d ∈ (bj,bj +1 ). Then,
Thus, I obtain the knot points (v * 0 , v * 1 , . . . , v * D ) in the valuation space that are associated with (b * 0 , b * 1 , . . . , b * D ).
A.2 Affiliated Private Value Paradigm
First, I employ the accept/reject sampler to draw (transformed) values from the statistical model in (13). Consider the kernel of (13) 3. If the proposal is not accepted, go back to step 1.
Note that the original value can be drawn by evaluatingF −1 (·|µ) at the transformed value.
Second, I evaluate the bidding function as follows. Let Θ be the k + 3 symmetric square matrix whose (i, j) element is θĩ ,j whereĩ andj are the i th and j th index in I = {−1, 0, 1, . . . , k, k + 1}, i.e.,ĩ = i − 2. Let also Φ x be the (k + 3) × 101 matrix whose (i, j) element is φ i (x j ) with the 101 equidistant knot points {x j } in [0, 1], defined above. Let f x := exp Φ x ΘΦ x − constant , i.e., the (i, j) element, say f x i,j , in f x is proportional to f (x i , x j |Θ); see the statistical model (13). 29 Let δ x be the matrix whose (i, j) element is δ x i,j := δ x i−1,j + 0.005 · (f x i,j + f x i−1,j ) with δ i,1 ≈ 0 (eps). Let a 1 be the diagonal element of the element-by-element product of f x and δ x , i.e., its j th element is f (x j , x j |Θ)
The constant is often necessary because, otherwise, some element in h will be recognized as inf in the machine. I use the average of all elements in Φ x ΘΦx. This constant is canceled out.
(If there is an inf in a 1 , such an element must be replaced by some large number.) Let a 2 collect a 2 j := a 2 j−1 + 0.005 · (a 1 j + a 1 j−1 ) with a small a 2 1 , i.e., Let a 5 be the diagonal of A 4 . Then, the j th element of the diagonal ofb :=v − A 4 approximates the equilibrium bidding functionb j := β(v j |µ, Θ). Then, one may find the knots in the valuation space that are associated with the knots in the bid space similarly to (18).
